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Abstract
An individual’s decisions are often guided by those of his or her peers, i.e., neighbors in a social network.
Presumably, being privy to the experiences of others aids in learning and decision making, but how much advantage
does an individual gain by observing her neighbors? Such problems make appearances in sociology and economics
and, in this paper, we present a novel model to capture such decision-making processes and appeal to the classical
multi-armed bandit framework to analyze it. Each individual, in addition to her own actions, can observe the actions
and rewards obtained by her neighbors, and can use all of this information in order to minimize her own regret. We
provide algorithms for this setting, both for stochastic and adversarial bandits, and show that their regret smoothly
interpolates between the regret in the classical bandit setting and that of the full-information setting as a function of the
neighbors’ exploration. In the stochastic setting the additional information must simply be incorporated into the usual
estimation of the rewards, while in the adversarial setting this is attained by constructing a new unbiased estimator
for the rewards and appropriately bounding the amount of additional information provided by the neighbors. These
algorithms are optimal up to log factors; despite the fact that the agents act independently and selfishly, this implies that
it is an approximate Nash equilibria for all agents to use our algorithms. Further, we show via empirical simulations
that our algorithms, often significantly, outperform existing algorithms that one could apply to this setting.
1 Introduction
Individuals often have access to information, via their social or economic network, that they can use to make improved
decisions. This phenomenon has been observed widely in the social and natural sciences. For instance, a recent work
([Yoo12]) studies farmers who, every year, have to decide which kind of seed to plant (not just what kind of crop, but
which variety of seed) in order to attain the most profit (i.e., revenue - cost). In their study, [Yoo12] finds that farmers’
decisions are based on a) their own experience in previous years of how different varieties performed, and b) the
experiences of peers attained either directly (explicitly via conversations with social contacts) or indirectly (implicitly
by observing the farming practices of peers). Moreover, the information farmers used is primarily from peers in their
physical neighborhood – not only because these are where their contacts are most likely to be, but also because the
profit is correlated due to similar soil and weather conditions. These connections between peers then form a network
of farmers across the country, where locally, each farmer is trying to learn the best seed for their farm using her own
information and that of her neighbors. As another example, consider WI-FI networks in which nodes want to send
their data across the best frequency band. Nodes could obtain the current quality of the band their peers are using
indirectly through capacity estimation or directly by message passing, and use this information to determine which
band to use. Similar social learning phenomena appear in many other areas in various disguises – e.g., in the acquisition
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of consumer products by individuals, the adoption of new technologies, the prevalence and spread of corruption, and
in the behavior of animals such as squirrels; see [LBG48, KL55, ZAA07, San06, ASC12]. A natural question then is:
How should an individual incorporate the information from their neighbors in order to make the best decisions, and
how much improvement can such information bring?
Figure 1: A social network in which all individuals play against
the same bandit, i.e., if two individuals select the same arm at
the same time step, they observe the same reward (up to noise).
At each time t, each individual selects an arm (shown), and then
observes its reward along with the actions/rewards of her neighbors.
E.g., the yellow circled individual would observe the reward of
actions 1, 4 and 6 in this time step.
Consider the following formulation geared towards
capturing the type of settings mentioned above (see also
Figure 1): at each time step each individual selects one
of K possible actions, observes the value or reward of
selecting that action, and observes the actions, values
and/or decision process of their neighbors in the network.
This selection and observation is repeated again and again,
and each individual has the end goal of identifying the
action a? ∈ K that brings them the best value over all
time steps; i.e., minimizing the regret. This formulation
seems to suggest that the problem is suited for study using
the bandit optimization framework, except that now there
is additional information available to an individual via
her neighbors.
Towards this, one approach could be to consider the
framework of bandits with side observations for which,
in the adversarial setting, variants of the multiplicative-
weight update algorithm have been developed with suc-
cess. Informally, side observations just mean that at each
time step, in addition to observing the reward of a selected
action a(t), one may observe (but not receive) rewards
from a set of other actions S(t). A recent body of work
has explored how to minimize regret for various different models of S(t). In the free observation model, the individual
is allowed to select S(t) up to some cardinality (e.g., [AKTT15]). However, if one tried to apply such algorithms to the
social settings considered above, it would require an individual to decide which actions her neighbors should take, and
hence is not feasible as a solution in this setting. In another line of work (e.g., [ACBDK15]) an action-network model
has been studied: Here, the actions form a network and the individual observes the rewards of the neighbors of the
action she selects (as opposed to the rewards of the actions that her neighbors select). The action-network is often taken
to be exogenous and can be changing over time. Thus, one can apply the algorithms developed in the action-network
setting to the social setting above by defining S(t) to be the set of actions selected by the individual’s neighbors;
however, this may not always be optimal for the social setting as neighbors can provide even more information (see
Section 4.5).
The above approaches have been developed in independent contexts and hence geared towards different settings.
Towards obtaining optimal results in the social setting described above, the challenge is to adequately model the
information from neighbors that can aid in learning, leverage it appropriately, and quantify the advantage it provides.
In this paper we present such a model and show how one can incorporate the additional social information in order
to obtain optimal results. More specifically, in the stochastic setting we show that incorporating side information in
a simple way gives rise to a near-optimal algorithm. Furthermore, in the adversarial setting, we present a modified
multiplicative-weight update algorithm that uses an new unbiased estimator to incorporate this information appropriately
into the estimation of the reward of each action. The proofs requires us to overcome some additional hurdles in order to
bound the amount of information gleaned from the neighbors and attain optimal bounds on the regret. Our algorithms
outperform other state-of-the-art bandit algorithms both theoretically (Section 4) and empirically (Section 5).
1.1 Summary of Our Results
Since our model appeals to the bandit framework, we start by recalling its salient features: In the bandit optimization
setting, there are K potential actions (arms), and the individual selects one arm at each time step. Each arm j has an
2
(unknown) reward gj(t) at time t = 1, . . . , T . The individual receives the reward ga(t)(t) for the selected arm a(t),
while the rewards gj(t) for all other actions j 6= a(t) remain unknown. Ideally, the individual would like to select the
arm with the best overall reward, i.e., j? = arg maxj E
[∑T
t=1 gj(t)
]
. However, in the absence of knowledge about the
reward structure, this is not feasible. Instead, as is prevalent in the online learning literature, j? is used as a benchmark
and the regret R (i.e., the difference between the individual’s rewards and those of the best arm) is minimized. Formally,
R
def
= E
[
T∑
t=1
gj?(t)−
T∑
t=1
ga(t)(t)
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in the rewards (if stochastic) and the randomness in the algorithm.1
An important divide arises from how the rewards are decided: for stochastic bandits, the rewards gj(t) are i.i.d. from
an (unknown) distribution Fj , and for adversarial bandits (also known as non-stochastic bandits), the rewards gj(t)
are set in an arbitrary manner by an adversary that knows the individual’s algorithm and past coin flips. In realistic
settings, such as the examples mentioned in the introduction, the situation is often somewhere in-between. Thus, in this
work we consider both extremes by analyzing both the stochastic and adversarial settings. In either case, algorithms
must carefully tradeoff between exploration (gaining new knowledge about the rewards) and exploitation (using current
knowledge to maximize rewards) in order to minimize regret. In either case, algorithms must carefully tradeoff between
exploration (gaining new knowledge about the rewards) and exploitation (using current knowledge to maximize rewards)
in order to minimize regret.
The Model. Firstly, we assume all individuals play against the same multi-armed bandit: in the stochastic setting, the
reward distributions Fi is the same for arm i for all individuals (although the realizations at any given time may differ),
and in the adversarial setting the reward vector g(t) selected by the adversary at time t is the same for all individuals.
Clearly, there must be some similarity in the rewards between neighbors for social learning to occur. Our results also
extend to the setting in which the distributions or rewards are correlated, e.g., via 0-mean noise (i.e., each individual
i receives the reward as above + individual noise); for ease of presentation we omit this extension, the proofs follow
analogously. Secondly, we assume that each individual can observe the following for all neighbors i:
(1) the actions ai(t),
(2) the rewards gai(t)(t), and
(3) (for the adversarial setting only) the probability distribution each neighbor used to select an arm at the
previous time step.
Assumptions (1) and (2) are natural and directly inspired by applications such as those mentioned in the introduction;
individuals either directly or indirectly observe their neighbors’ actions and rewards. (3) additionally assumes a limited
knowledge of how neighbors made their decisions on a step-by-step basis, without having to assume we know their
overall algorithm or restricting their behavior in any way. All individuals are free to select their probability distributions
arbitrarily (and depend arbitrarily on each other), and each one can draw her decision independently of the rest. While
it would be nice to drop assumption (3) entirely, this would prevent us from attaining optimal regret bounds (see
Proposition 4.5 and the discussion in Appendix A.4).2
Importantly, an individual
(4) does not know about the actions and rewards of individuals beyond her neighbors,
(5) does not know any global properties of the network,
(6) does not know which algorithm other individuals (including neighbors) are using, and
(7) cannot dictate or coerce other individuals to act a certain way.
Removing any of assumptions (4)-(7) would be unnatural for the social learning setting described above: If (4) does not
hold, we would simply consider such an individual a neighbor, removing (5) is unnatural as the network can be very
large and we cannot expect to have knowledge of distant individuals, removing (6) seems impractical as it would mean
that individuals have a detailed knowledge of how neighbors select actions, and allowing individuals to be coerced as in
1This is often referred to as pseudo-regret; in this paper we simply refer to it as regret.
2Alternatively, under different assumptions (e.g., if we assume the neighbors are using an algorithm such as EXP3) we can estimate these
distributions which would suffice.
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(7) would be in conflict with the idea that every individual seeks to improve her own performance. Hence, given (1)-(7),
any improvement in the individual’s regret arises solely from passive observation of local information.
Remark 1.1. We emphasize that, by setting up the model as above, agents can act independently and work to selfishly
minimize their own regret. Hence, (as our algorithms are near-optimal) it is always an individual’s (approximate)
best-response to use our algorithms, regardless of what her neighbors do. Putting it another way, when the action
space is the set of algorithms, it is an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for all nodes to use ours – no individual can
significantly improve their regret by deviating to use an alternate algorithm. This gives rise to an interesting set of
questions regarding the average regret of a network (depending on its structure) in equilibrium, or the expected regret
in equilibrium of a node as a function of its position in the network. Some immediate implications about the properties
of such equilibria follow directly from our results.
The Algorithm in the Stochastic Setting. Algorithms for the classical stochastic bandit setting [AG12, ACBF02,
GC11] maintain metrics about the observed samples, and determine which arm to select based on these metrics. Hence,
a natural strategy would be for an individual in the networked setting to take one of these algorithms and incorporate
samples obtained from neighbors along with her own without differentiating between the two. Indeed, we this simple
insight suffices to get near-optimal results. Our UCBN algorithm extends the classic UCB algorithm by incorporating
all observed samples indiscriminately. We show that this suffices to improve performance, often dramatically, both
asymptotically and in silico. These results are presented in Section 3 and Appendix B. We show that the regret of
our algorithm interpolates between O(1) and the O(K lnT ) regret for the classic bandit setting depending on the
amount of exploration conducted by the neighbors (see Theorem 3.1), and these bounds are asymptotically optimal
(see Theorem B.3). As a corollary, in the complete network with b vertices, if all neighbors use our algorithm (i.e.,
in equilibrium) the regret reduces to O(K lnTb ), which is optimal as even a fully centralized approach can speed up
learning by at most a factor of the increase in the number of available samples, i.e., b (see Corollary B.2). The theoretical
results are presented in Section 3 and Appendix B), and the empirical results in Section 5.2).
The Algorithm in the Adversarial Setting. Algorithms for classic adversarial bandits are, typically, variations of the
multiplicative weights update method. Such algorithms maintain a weight for each arm, and (multiplicatively) update
that weight based on the observed reward(s). An individual then selects an action proportionally to the weight vector. It
is easy to verify that if we naïvely incorporate samples from neighbors as if they were our own into the weight vector
there is no improvement in the regret. Our variation of the multiplicative-weights update algorithm a) incorporates
information in a clever manner (that allows for new improved bounds) by using a different unbiased estimator for the
rewards and then b) adapts according to the behavior of its neighbors by tuning its update parameters. We show that the
regret of our algorithm provably interpolates between the O(
√
KT lnK) regret for the classical bandit setting and the
O(
√
T lnK) regret for the full-information setting (where the full vector g(t) is observed at each time step) depending
on the amount of exploration conducted by the neighbors (see Theorem 4.1), and is optimal up to log factors (see
Theorem 4.2 & 4.5). Moreover, our algorithm improves performance over the state-of-the art in silico. The theoretical
results are presented in Section 4 and Appendix A), and the empirical results in Section 5.1).
2 Related Work
Distributed learning in a network is a broad topic and has been studied under various names in several disciplines.
However, to the best of our knowledge, our model for learning from neighbors, along with its assumptions and non-
assumptions (1)-(7) which are motivated by relevant settings in sociology and economics, is novel. Here we briefly
survey the closest relatives to our work.
In the study of non-strategic learning on networks, individuals are connected via a network, and each individual has a
finite set of actions with probabilistic rewards whose distributions depend on the state of the world (see [Goy05], Chapter
2 for a survey). Indeed, would be similar to our model in the stochastic setting. However, work in this area has focused on
studying variants of a greedy algorithm, and answering the question of whether learning (i.e., discovery of the state of the
world, and hence convergence to the best action) occurs asymptotically (see, e.g., [BG98, EF93, BG01, GK03, GJ10]).
Instead, we are concerned with regret, which could be loosely interpreted as the rate of convergence.
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Recall that in models of bandits with side observations, in addition to observing ga(t)(t), one may observe (but
not receive) additional rewards gS(t)(t). The set of arms S(t) depends on the particular model of side observations. In
the free observations model, the individual can select B additional arms to observe at each time step; i.e., |S(t)| = B
and the individual selects S(t) for all t. Such models have been studied both for stochastic ([YM09]) and adversarial
([AMS12, AKTT15]) bandits. Without assumption (7), we could apply such algorithms directly because an individual
could dictate which actions her neighbors should take. In the social setting we cannot hope to control our neighbor’s
decisions in this manner. Still, we show that the performance of our algorithm is equivalent empirically to such
algorithms (see Section 5). In the arm-network (or action-network) setting, the individual observes the rewards of the
neighbors of the arm she selects. Such stochastic ([CKLB12, BES14]) and adversarial ([MS11, ACBGM13, KNVM14,
ACBDK15]) bandit settings have been studied. While one could apply these algorithms to the social setting, some social
information, in particular from assumption (3), is left on the table. Leveraging this allows us to provably outperform
such approaches (see Section 4.5), and empirically the difference can be dramatic (see Figure 3).
Other work has considered bounding the cumulative regret of all individuals, rather than individuals minimizing
their own regret. Towards this, centralized algorithms for various versions of stochastic bandits have been studied, in
particular for the complete graph ([BES13, SBFH+13, CBGZ13]). Although the centralized setting is not the object
of our study, as a corollary, we obtain a centralized algorithm for adversarial bandits that is optimal on the complete
network (see Section 4.6).
3 Technical Overview for the Stochastic Setting
To describe our algorithm, let us first revisit the UCB algorithm, first introduced by Auer et. al. [ACBF02] and since
widely extended and studied (see, e.g., [Bub10, MMS11, GC11]). UCB is an asymptotically optimal algorithm for
stochastic bandits with many well-studied variants (see, e.g., [BCB12] for an overview). The idea behind the algorithm
uses the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty; the algorithm maintains an optimistic upper bound on the
mean reward of each arm, and selects an arm with maximal upper bound. As is standard, we assume the probability
distributions satisfy Hoeffding’s lemma. Then, arm j at time t has an upper bound
Uj(t) = µ̂j(t) +
√
α ln(t)
2nj(t)
(1)
which holds with probability at least 1 − t−α when µ̂j(t) is the sample mean of arm j, and nj(t) is the number of
samples we have for j. At time t, an arm a(t) ∈ arg maxj{Uj(t)} is selected.
We make a simple extension to UCB for an agent on a network: the agent simply incorporates all samples and
all rewards into nj and µ̂j regardless of whether it came from her action or was observed from one of her neighbors.
We denote this algorithm by UCBN, and note that it can be implemented by an individual irrespective of the graph
structure and the algorithm(s) her neighbors may employ. The regret of UCBN algorithm is upper bounded as follows.
Theorem 3.1. Consider an agent with neighbors who play arbitrarily. Let n′i(t) be the number times arm i has been
selected by one of her neighbors by time t. Then, the regret of UCBN for any α > 2 is
R ≤
∑
i,∆i>0
(
max
{
max
t=1,..,T
{
2α ln t
∆i
− n′i(t)∆i
}
, 0
}
+
α
α− 2
)
, (2)
where ∆i is the difference between µi? and µi.
This result is asymptotically optimal (see Theorem B.3). The regret differs from the regret of the classic UCB
regret by the −n′j(T )∆j term, and, depending on the behavior of the neighbors, can potentially take the agent from
logarithmic to constant regret.
Clearly, the performance of an agent must depend on the behavior of her neighbors. In the worst case, if there
are clumsy agents who always select the same arm, then our regret is not improved much. However, as long as the
agent has at least one neighbor who explores an arm uniformly at random with probability εt ∈ ω(K ln tt ) at time t
(e.g., this occurs if a neighbor uses an adaptive greedy algorithm), then the regret is O(1)! Hence, this allows us to
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interpret neighbor behavior to our regret seamlessly. As an instructive example, consider the setting where all agents use
UCBN in a complete graph. The regret in this setting is O
(
K lnT
b
)
. In other words, the regret of an agent using UCBN
is a factor O(1/b) less than that of an agent using UCB – indeed we cannot hope to do better, even in a completely
centralized setting. The proof parallels the proofs for the original UCB results (see, e.g., [BCB12] for a template), and
can be found along with further discussion in Appendix B. While the story for the stochastic setting turns out to be
simple and easy to manage, the adversarial setting, as we see below, turns out to be more challenging.
4 Technical Overview for the Adversarial Setting
4.1 Preliminaries
The multiplicative weight update method has been discovered many times in many fields over the past century (see
[AHK12] for an overview). It is a simple yet surprisingly powerful way to conservatively update beliefs about the
benefit of a given arm and is extremely effective for adversarial bandits and is asymptotically optimal up to log factors
(see, e.g., [ACBFS02, FKM05, ACBGM13]). Such algorithms for the full information setting (where all rewards are
observed at each time step) maintain a vector of weights wj for each arm j, and (multiplicatively) update it at each time
step: wj(t + 1) = wj(t)eδgj(t), where 0 ≤ gj(t) ≤ 1 is the reward observed for arm j at time t and δ is the update
parameter. The probability of choosing arm j at time t is proportional to the weight wj(t), namely, pj(t) =
wj(t)
Wt
where wj(0) = 1/N, and Wt =
∑N
j=1 wj(t). This algorithm, for an optimal choice of δ has regret Θ(
√
T lnK).
Extending to the bandit setting uses a simple trick; instead of using gj(t) to update, we use an unbiased estimator ĝj(t)
for gj(t) (see, e.g., [ACBFS02, FKM05]). Since we no longer observe the reward of all of the arms, we must also
ensure some exploration should be added to the algorithm. This is achieved by setting a lower bound η ∈ [0, 1] (the
exploration parameter) on the probability of exploration: pj(t) = (1− η)wj(t)Wt +
η
K . This algorithm, also known as
EXP3 [ACBFS02], achieves regret O(
√
TK lnK), and is optimal up to log factors for the right choice of parameters
(see [BCB12] for an exposition).
4.2 Formal Statement of Results
We call our algorithm in the adversarial setting EXPN. Recall that pj(t) is the probability that an individual selects
arm j at time t. Let qij(t) be the probability that her neighbor i selects arm j at time t. We denote the number of an
individual’s neighbors by b. Note that the number of nodes in a network, denoted by N , may be much larger, but the
remaining network does not play a role in the algorithm or main results.
Theorem 4.1. Given an individual with b neighbors who are playing arbitrarily, the regret when using the EXPN
algorithm is
REXPN ≤ E
2
√√√√(T + T∑
t=1
γt
)
lnK
 (3)
where γt =
∑K
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t)+
∑b
`=1 q
`
j(t)
.
Before discussing the proof, we first re-write the results in a way that makes them easier to interpret.
For ease of presentation, momentarily assume that for all arms j ∈ [K], neighbors i ∈ [b], and times t ∈ [T ] we
have that qij(t) ≥ εiK for some εi ∈ (0, 1].3 We can then reinterpret REXPN as a function of the bandit regret (REXP3)
and full information information regret (RFULL) as follows:
REXPN =
 RFULL ·
√
β Θ ≤ 1−
√
lnK
βT
REXP3 ·
√
β+K/Θ
2K 1−
√
lnK
(β+KΘ )T
≤ Θ
(4)
3This assumption is not required for the proof of Theorem 4.1, only for the ease of interpretation in Equation 4. Note that if a neighbor is running
any variant of the multiplicative weight update method, this condition is satisfied. Removing this assumption requires the number of non-zero εj to
be tracked for each j, and these numbers would appear in the regret bound.
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where Θ = Πbi=1
(
1− εiK
)
and β = 1
1−(1− 1K )Θ
+ 1.
In particular, note that when Θ = 1, none of the individual’s neighbors maintain a probability distribution that is
bounded away from 0 for all arms. In other words, the neighbors are not exploring effectively. In this case, β = K + 1
and REXPN ∈ O(
√
TK lnK), the same as in the classical bandit setting. On the other hand, for example, when
Θ ≤ 1/2, then β ≤ 3 and hence REXPN ∈ O(
√
T lnK), the same as in the full-information setting. Hence, this
algorithm smoothly interpolates between bandit regret and full information regret as a function of the neighbors’
exploration.
The proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Equation 4 appear in Section 4.4 and Appendix A respectively. At first, the
proofs parallel standard approaches to analyze the multiplicative-weight update method; the crucial difference is a new
unbiased estimator that is used in order to incorporate the neighbors’ information (see Section 4.3). This leads to the
following bound on the regret:
R ≤ lnK
δ
+ ηT + δT
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
.
The technical obstacle then becomes attaining tight bounds on the
∑K
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
term (see Lemmas A.2 and A.4). What
remains is then a straightforward (albeit tedious) optimization problem on the parameters η and δ.
We can further show that Theorem 4.1 is optimal up to log factors.
Theorem 4.2. Given an individual with b neighbors who are playing arbitrarily, the regret when using the EXPN
algorithm is
REXPN = Ω

√√√√T + T∑
t=1
γt

where γt =
∑K
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t)+
∑b
`=1 q
`
j(t)
as defined above.
This information theoretic lower bound follows by extending the lower bound attained for the classic bandit setting
(see, e.g., [ACBF02]), and is given in Appendix A.3. This theorem shows that the analysis of our algorithm is tight
up to log factors and will help us establish dominance over other potential approaches as discussed in Section 4.5 – a
weaker lower bound that is not algorithm-dependent (which matches the above bound for pathological cases such as
when all neighbors always play the same action) is presented in Theorem 4.5.
4.3 The EXPN Algorithm
Key to our EXPN algorithm is the following new unbiased estimator for the rewards:
ĝj(t) =
{
gj(t)
p′j(t)
if some individuals selects action j at time t
0 otherwise,
(5)
where p′j(t) is the probability that at least one individual selects action j, i.e.,
p′j(t)
def
= 1− (1− pj(t))(1− q1j (t)) · · · (1− qbj(t)). (6)
The algorithm then updates the weights according to wj(t+1) = wj(t)eδĝj(t) = wj(0)eδ
∑t
s=1 ĝj(s), where wj(0) = 1,
and updates the probability distributions according to pj(t) = (1 − η)wj(t)Wt +
η
K where Wt =
∑
j wj(t). Note that
this algorithm can be implemented irrespective of the network structure and depends only on the information obtained
locally from neighbors as defined in our model. In essence, the key to our algorithm is two fold:
1. Design a new unbiased estimator ĝj(t) that incorporates the side observations obtained from neighbors: Unlike
for stochastic bandits, naïve estimators do not suffice, and a new approach is required.4
4We must ensure that in bounding E[ĝ2j ], we get some improvement over the usual bandit setting; it is easy to verify that such bounds do not hold
for naïve estimators such as the average of the neighbors’ estimators.
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2. Decouple the exploration and exploitation parameters: When an individual’s neighbors explore a lot, she could
benefit by free-riding off of the exploration of her neighbors; this is accomplished by decreasing her exploration
parameter η. However, if we take δ = η/K as in EXP3, this dampens our updates. Hence we need η and δ to act
independently.
This analysis is presented in Appendix A.1.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
While the above version of the algorithm gives a natural interpretation of the parameters, in order to attain the stronger
regret bound in Theorem 4.1 we take a slightly different approach. Instead of decoupling the parameters η and δ, we
instead use an adaptive δt that changes based on the amount of information received from the neighbors.5 In particular,
we let δt =
√
lnK∑t
c=1(1+γc)
and can take η = 0. Importantly, note that we use the same unbiased estimator in either
version of the algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The first part of proof (from Equation (7) to Equation (12)) parallels the traditional analysis for
analyzing multiplicative weight update algorithms; for completeness we present the steps without going into the details
(see [BCB12] for an exposition). We first write E[ĝj(t)] as follows:
E[ĝj(t)] =
1
δt
(lnE [exp (−δt (ĝj(t)− E[ĝj(t)]))]− lnE [exp (−δtĝj(t))]) (7)
where the expectation is over the randomness of the estimator and choice of the arm. We will now consider the
right-hand side of the equation and upper bound the two terms separately.
1
δt
lnE [exp (−δt(ĝj(t)− E[ĝj(t)]))] = 1
δt
lnE [exp(−δtĝj(t)] + E[ĝj(t)])
≤ 1
δt
E[exp(−δtĝj(t))− 1 + δtĝj(t)] ≤ δt
2
E[ĝ2j (t)],
(8)
where we use the inequalities lnx ≤ x− 1 and exp(−x)− 1 + x ≤ x2/2 for x ≥ 0. Now, let Ĝj(t) =
∑t
a=1 ĝj(t),
and let ψ(t) = 1δt ln
(
1
K
∑K
j=1 exp(−δtĜj(t))
)
. Hence,
− 1
δt
ln E
at∼p′t
E
j∼p′t
exp(−δtĝj(t)) ≤ − 1
δt
E
at∼p′t
ln E
j∼p′t
exp(−δtĝj(t))
− 1
δt
E
at∼p′t
ln
 K∑
j=1
exp(−δtĜj(t))∑K
c=1 exp(−δtĜc(t− 1))
 ≤ ψ(t− 1)− ψ(t) (9)
where we recall that η = 0, the first inequality we use Jensen’s inequality, and note that δt is decreasing in t. By
summing up the terms in Equation (7) and (9) over all t we get
T∑
t=1
E[ĝj(t)] ≤
T∑
t=1
δt
2
E[ĝ2j (t)]− E
at∼p′t
ψ(T ). (10)
We now bound −ψ(T ) as follows:
−ψ(T ) = lnK
δT
− 1
δT
ln
 K∑
j=1
exp(−δT Ĝj(T ))
 ≤ lnK
δT
− 1
δT
ln
(
exp(−δT Ĝk(T ))
)
=
lnK
δT
+ Ĝk(T ).
(11)
5Adaptive δt are often used when T is unknown; here the adaptive δt serves a different function by allowing us to explicitly respond to the
neighbors’ actions.
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Plugging this into in the above inequality yields
T∑
t=1
E[ĝj(t)] ≤
T∑
t=1
δt
2
E[ĝ2j (t)] +
lnK
δT
+ E
at∼p′t
[Ĝk(T )]. (12)
Now, we note that given pj(t) at time t we have
E [ĝj(t)] = gj(t), (13a)
E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pj(t)ĝj(t)
]
=
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pj(t)gj(t) = E
[
T∑
t=1
ga(t)(t)
]
, and (13b)
E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pj(t)ĝ
2
j (t)
]
=
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
g2j (t) ≤
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
(13c)
as gj(t) ≤ 1, and where the expectation is over randomness of the algorithm. Now, attaining a good bound on the regret
boils down to attaining a good bound on
∑K
i=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
. Towards this, we need a technical lemma that, in effect, allows
bounds the amount of information received from neighbors.
Lemma 4.3.
∑K
j=1
pj
1−(1−pj)(1−q1j )···(1−qbj )
≤∑Kj=1 pjpj+q1j+q2j+···+qbj + 1.
The proof is presented in Appendix 4.4. Using this Lemma and combining all of the above, we get
R ≤ lnK
δT
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
δt(1 + γt). (14)
To conclude the proof, recall that δt =
√
lnK∑t
c=1(1+γc)
, use Lemma 3.5 of [ACBG02], and take expectation of the both
sides of Equation (14).
4.5 Comparison to Alternate Approaches
Figure 2: The arm-network has an edge from arm
u to arm v if, having selected arm u, we observe the
reward of arm v. Arms selected by neighbors in the
social network are form a clique, and the remaining
arms have self loops and edges to all selected arms.
Instead of developing a new algorithm, we could have attempted to
leverage an existing one. The most natural one to try is from the
arm-network setting which is as follows: there is a single individual
and the bandit’s arms form an arm-network which can change over
time. An edge from arm u to arm v means that by choosing arm
u we observe the reward of arm v. Thus we could, in retrospect at
each time step, recreate an arm-network (see Figure 2) and apply an
arm-network algorithm. We consider EXP3G ([ACBDK15]), which
is the state-of-the-art solution for such problems, and performed
best amongst arm-network algorithms in our empirical simulations.
However, we prove in Appendix A.4 that our algorithm is at least as
good.
Proposition 4.4. REXPN = O(REXP3G).
Moreover, as we will see in Section 5, the regret of EXPN is
often drastically better empirically. This because EXP3G, and other similar algorithms, were developed from different
settings in which it was not possible to make use of the probability distributions afforded to us by assumption (3).
Indeed, without this assumption, one can get a stronger lower bound than the one presented above.
Proposition 4.5. Let nt be the size of the set of arms selected (arbitrarily) by all of the individual’s neighbors at time t.
Then, the regret RA for any algorithm A in our setting without assumption (3) is RA = Ω
(√
T +
∑T
t=1(K − nt)
)
.
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The proof follows from Theorem 5 of [ACBG+14]. Our EXPN algorithm is often able to beat this bound
by leveraging (3). For example, this proposition implies that if we have a complete network on b vertices where
logK  b K, then REXP3G = Ω
(√
(K − b)T
)
while in our case REXPN = O
(√
K
b T
)
(see Corollary 4.7).
4.6 A Centralized Solution for the Network
Our model and algorithm are formulated for an individual because this allows us to draw the most general conclusions –
bounding the individual’s regret as a function of the neighbors’ behavior. However, a surprising feature is that it can
also be made into a centralized solution. In the general case, this requires assuming there is an external coordinator that
can select a maximum-degree individual to lead and direct the rest on how to act as follows: Let v? be the maximum
degree node selected. The coordinator directs v? to use the EXPN algorithm. The remaining nodes u are each assigned
a neighbor vu that lies on the shortest path between them and v?, and are directed to copy the probability distribution
that vu used in the previous time step.
Theorem 4.6. Using the above centralized algorithm, the regret of all individuals is at most
R = O
(
∆ +
√(
1 +
K
1 + bmax
)
T lnK
)
, (15)
where bmax is the degree of v? and ∆ is the diameter of the network.
The proof follows, with minor modifications, from the proof of Theorem 4.1; the main difference regards accounting
for the delay (of at most ∆ time steps) for the farthest node from v? to update their probability distribution. By replacing
γt with K1+bmax , this gives us the resulting regret bound. In the simple case of a complete network on N nodes, no
coordinator is required, and we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.7. On a complete network with b nodes, if all nodes use the EXPN algorithm, then they attain R =
O
(√(
1 + Kb
)
T lnK
)
, which is optimal (up to log factors) for any centralized solution.
This again follows from the proof of Theorem 4.1 using the fact that the number of neighbors is b− 1 on a complete
network, and that a centralized solution has average regret Ω(
√(
1 + Kb
)
T ) as shown in [AKTT15].
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Adversarial Setting
Benchmarks. We compare our algorithm against the bandit algorithms developed for various settings with side-
information, namely EXP3G ([ACBDK15]), EXP.IX ([KNVM14]) and BEXP ([AKTT15]). The first two are
designed for the arm-network setting as described in Section 4.5, while the latter is designed for the free-exploration
setting described in Section 2. Recall that in free-exploration there are no neighbors; rather there is a budget B, and at
each time step the individual can choose up to B arms to select. In order to attain a fair comparison, we assume we
have budget B = b+ 1 for BEXP, where b is the number of neighbors.
Experimental Setup. For the simulations we use the decoupled version of the EXPN algorithm as presented in
Section 4.3; the results for the adaptive algorithm version would be even better. We consider a bandit with Bernoulli
rewards that has a single good arm with mean 0.7, while the remaining arms have mean 0.5. This is similar to the worst
case (minimax) bandit; the difficulty arises from the fact that it is hard, in an information theoretic sense, to distinguish
the single good arm from the rest with few samples. Indeed the performance for our algorithm in comparison to our
benchmarks is only improved for all other settings we attempted.
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(a) Regret in a complete network on 5 nodes. We vary T for K = 50.
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(b) Regret in a random 5-regular network with 50 nodes. We vary T for
K = 50.
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(c) The average regret in various network topologies. The size of the networks
is 10.
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(d) Regret ratio. We vary time T for K = 50 and N = 5.
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(e) Regret ratio. We vary the number of arms K for T = 5 · 104 and N = 5.
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(f) Regret ratio. We vary the number of nodes N for K = 50 and T = 106.
Figure 3: Performance of our algorithm (EXPN) for the adversarial setting against benchmarks. Our algorithm
significantly outperforms EXP3, indicating that the presence of neighbors indeed improves learning. It also significantly
outperforms arm-network algorithms (EXP3G and EXP.IX) that could be applied in our setting. Surprisingly, it’s
performance is as good as BEXP, which would require a single node to dictate the choices of her neighbors; hence, our
distributed algorithm is performing as well as a centralized one. Figures (a)-(c) depict the regret. Figures (d)-(f) depict
the regret ratio, i.e., the ratio between an algorithm’s regret with b neighbors over its regret with 0 neighbors (where b
depends on the network structure addressed in the corresponding subfigure).
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Performance in Networks. In addition to exploring the effect of the various algorithm on a single individual, we
are able to consider various network topologies and consider the regret as a whole. Towards this, in the first set of
simulations, all nodes in the specified networks use the same algorithm. We first compare the regret of EXPN against
the benchmarks in a complete network on 5 nodes (Figure 3(a)); even on such a small network the difference in regret
is dramatic.6 We significantly outperform arm-network algorithms (EXP3G and EXP.IX), which empirically are
initially worse than even EXP3. Asymptotically EXP3G eventually outperforms EXP3, although EXP.IX does not.
Surprisingly, our algorithm performs as well as BEXP, which would be equivalent to identifying a single node as the
leader and having them dictate the action of all other nodes. Hence, our distributed algorithm is as good as a centralized
one. For comparison, we also consider a random 5-regular graph on 50 nodes (Figure 3(b)), and observe that the
performance of all algorithms is roughly equivalent to the complete network on 5 nodes; i.e., the primary determining
factor in the regret appears to be the number of neighbors rather than the topology of the network.
We also consider the regret of EXPN on various network topologies on 10 vertices: the complete network, a
random 5-regular network, a cycle, and a star network (Figure 3(c)). When the number of neighbors differ in a topology,
the regret of the nodes may differ; the star is the extreme example and we depict the minimum (for the center node),
maximum (for one of the leaves) and average regret. As expected, the more neighbors one has, the better the regret is,
with the internal node of star outperforming all. We also observe that there is an advantage to having neighbors that are
not well-connected; despite a node in the complete network having the same degree as the center node of the star, the
former has more regret. Because the nodes that are not well-connected receive less information, they must explore more
– this is advantageous for their neighbors.
Performance of Individuals. Moving back to analyzing the performance for an individual, consider a setting where
her neighbors all use the EXP3 algorithm. We measure the regret ratio, i.e., the ratio between the regret of bandit
algorithm A when the node has b neighbors divided by the regret of A when the node has 0 neighbors. This allows us
to better visualize the improvement in regret that each algorithm obtains as a function of the number of neighbors. We
vary time T (Figure 3(d)), the number of arms K (Figure 3(e) and the number of neighbors b (Figure 3(f)). We observe
that, in all cases, our EXPN algorithm always matches or outperforms the benchmarks. The fact that the performance
of our EXPN is comparable to that of BEXP is surprising, as we could not hope to do any better.
5.2 Stochastic Setting
The setup for the empirical results in this section parallel that of Section 5.1. Recall that we make no assumption in our
algorithm about our neighbors or how they play. We simply observe their actions and rewards. We let α = 2.5 in the
UCBN algorithm; the performance could be improved by optimizing α. We first observe that more neighbors leads to
less regret (Figure 4(f)).
We then consider the regret of UCBN on various network topologies on 10 vertices: the complete network, a
random 5-regular network, and a star network (Figure 4(c)). Similar to the previous experiments, for networks in which
all vertices have the same number of neighbors (all but the star network), all agents attain the same regret and hence we
report the average regret. However, this is not the case if the number of neighbors differ; the star is the extreme example
and we depict the minimum (for the center node), maximum (for one of the leaves) and average regret. As expected, the
more neighbors one has, the better the regret is, with the complete network and center of star outperforming all. We also
observe that there is advantage to having neighbors that are not well-connected; despite a node in the complete network
having the same degree as the center node of the star, the former has slightly more regret. The reason is a neighbor with
lower degree attains less information from neighbors and explore the suboptimal arms more which itself is in the favor
of its neighbors (here the center of star).
We then consider the regret ratio, i.e., the ratio between the regret of bandit algorithm A when the agent has b
neighbors divided by the regret ofA when the agent has 0 neighbors. This allows us to better visualize the improvement
in regret that each algorithm obtains as a function of the number of neighbors. We vary the number of arms K (Figure
4(e) and the number of neighbors b (Figure 4(f)). We observe that, in all cases, our algorithm UCBN attains the
theoretical regret ratio, i.e, in the complete graph when all agents use UCBN the regret ration Ab → 1/b as T →∞.
6Indeed, on larger networks the differences are only more pronounced – we present the results on a small network in order to be able to visualize
them adequately.
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(a) Regret in a complete network on 5 agents. We vary T for K = 5.
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(b) Regret in a random 5-regular network with 10 agents. We vary T for
K = 5.
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(c) The average regret in various network topologies. The size of the networks
is 10, K = 50 and all agents use UCBN.
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(d) Regret in the complete network when we vary the number of agents for
K = 5 and T = 25 · 104 .
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(e) Regret ratio in the complete network on 5 agents. We vary K for T =
25 · 104.
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(f) Regret ratio in the complete network when we vary the number of agents
for K = 50 and T = 25 · 104 .
Figure 4: Performance of our algorithm (UCBN) for the stochastic setting against benchmarks. Our algorithm
significantly outperforms UCB, indicating that the presence of neighbors indeed improves learning. It also significantly
outperforms GOB.LIN that could be applied in our setting (Figure 4(d)). Figures (a)-(d) depict the regret. Figures
(e)-(f) depict the regret ratio, i.e., the ratio between an algorithm’s regret with b neighbors over its regret with 0 neighbors
(where b depends on the network structure addressed in the corresponding subfigure).
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Finally, we compare our algorithm to the one proposed in [CBGZ13] (GOB.LIN); see Figure 4(d). Although
this algorithm is a centralized and developed for a different setting (namely, for linear contextual bandits), it can be
adapted to our setting by assuming that individuals are cooperative instead of selfish. Despite the centralized nature of
GOB.LIN, our algorithm outperforms its regret.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we consider a model for social learning that puts the problem in the the bandit framework This model
allows the problem to be analyzed both in the stochastic and adversarial bandit setting, and we provide algorithms for
both cases. The regret of our algorithms interpolates between the regret of the traditional bandit setting (e.g., when
an individual has no neighbors) and the regret of the full information setting (e.g., when the number of neighbors
goes to infinity), and are optimal up to log factors. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that we outperform
state-of-the-art bandit algorithms that one could also apply to this setting, and illustrate how our approach could also
lead to centralized algorithms of interest.
With respect to improvements to the social learning model, relaxing assumption (3) would be ideal. As we have
shown (see Proposition 4.5), removing it entirely results in strictly weaker regret bounds. Would an alternate relaxed
assumption suffice? Lastly, it remains to formally study the effect of arbitrary network topologies on the regret, both for
the individual (based on their position in the network) and on average.
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A Adversarial Bandits
A.1 Regret bound for Equation 4
We first state and prove a slightly simpler regret upper bound that is more intuitive, and then show how to enhance the
proof to give Theorem 4.1 in Appendix A.2. In this regret bound the algorithm is as described in the main body of the
paper, and we use a fixed (as opposed to adaptive) parameters δ and η.
Theorem A.1. Given an agent with b neighbors who are playing arbitrarily, the regret of an agent using the EXPN
algorithm is
R ∈ O(
√
βT lnK)
where
Θ = Πbi=1
(
1− εi
K
)
and β =
1
1− (1− 1K )Θ + 1.
for an optimal choice of η and δ that depends on Θ.
More precisely, we show that
R ≤

2
√
βT lnK if Θ ≤ 1−
√
lnK
βT , for η = 0, δ =
√
lnK
βT ,√
βT lnK +
√
(β + KΘ )T lnK if 1−
√
lnK
βT ≤ Θ ≤ 1−
√
lnK
(β+KΘ )T
, for η = 0, δ = 1−Θ,
2
√(
β + KΘ
)
T lnK if 1−
√
lnK
(β+KΘ )T
≤ Θ
for η = KΘ
(√
lnK
(β+KΘ )T
+ (Θ− 1)
)
, δ =
√
lnK
(β+KΘ )T
.
We can now directly reinterpret this regret (REXPN) as a function of the bandit regret (REXP3) and full information
information regret (RMUA) as in Equation 4. In particular, note that when Θ = 1, none of our neighbors maintain a
probability distribution that is bounded away from 0 for all arms. Hence, our neighbors are effectively not exploring.
In this case, β = K + 1 and REXPN ∈ O(
√
TK lnK), the same as in the classical bandit setting. On the other hand,
when Θ ≤ 1/2, then β ≤ 3 and hence REXPN ∈ O(
√
T lnK), the same as in the full-information setting. Hence, this
algorithm smoothly interpolates between the bandit regret to full information regret as a function of the neighbor’s
exploration.
Proof. First, note that E[ĝj(t)] =
(
1− p′j(t)
) ·0+p′j(t) gj(t)p′j(t) = gj(t); hence we are indeed using an unbiased estimator
for the rewards. From the definition of wj(t) (see Section 4.3), we see that
ln
WT+1
W0
≥ ln wj(T + 1)
W0
≥ δ
T∑
t=1
ĝj(t)− lnK. (16)
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Moreover, using the definition of pj(t) (see Section 4.3),
Wt+1
Wt
=
K∑
j=1
wj(t)
Wt
eδĝj(t) =
K∑
j=1
(
pj(t)− ηK
1− η
)
eδĝj(t).
Since the algorithm selects a δ such that δĝj(t) < 1, we can use the inequality ez ≤ 1 + z + z2, which holds for all
z ≤ 1. Therefore,
Wt+1
Wt
≤
K∑
j=1
(
pj(t)− ηK
1− η
)
(1 + δĝj(t) + (δĝj(t))
2)
≤ 1 + δ
1− η
K∑
j=1
pj(t)ĝj +
δ2
1− η
K∑
j=1
pj(t)ĝj
2.
(17)
Taking logarithms of Equation (17) and using the inequality ln(1 + x) < x which holds for all x > 0, we get
ln
Wt+1
Wt
≤ δ
1− η
K∑
j=1
pj(t)ĝj +
δ2
1− η
K∑
j=1
pj(t)ĝj
2. (18)
Since
ln
WT+1
W0
=
T∑
t=0
ln
Wt+1
Wt
,
combining Equations (16) and (18) with above and noting that ĝi(0) = 0 we have that
δ
T∑
t=1
ĝj(t)− lnK ≤ δ
1− η
T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)ĝj(t) +
δ2
1− η
T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)(ĝj(t))
2. (19)
Now, we note that given pj(t) at time t we have
E [ĝj(t)] = gj(t), (20a)
E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pj(t)ĝj(t)
]
=
T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)gj(t) = E
[
T∑
t=1
ga(t)(t)
]
, and (20b)
E
 T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)ĝ
2
j (t)
 = T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
g2j (t). (20c)
Where the expectation is over randomness of the algorithm. We will upper bound Equation (49c). Recall that gj(t) ≤ 1
for all j, t. Hence, for all t,
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
g2j (t) ≤ max

K∑
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
 .
Where the maximization is over the space of valid probabilities for actions. This is upper bounded by Lemma A.2
β
def
=
1
1− (1− 1K )Θ
+ 1.
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Since Equation (19) holds for all j, by (49), and Lemma A.2, we get
δmax
j
[
T∑
t=1
gj(t)
]
− lnK ≤ δ
1− ηE
[
T∑
t=1
ga(t)(t)
]
+
δ2
1− ηβT.
Since gi(t) ≤ 1, we rearrange to get the following upper bound on the regret of our algorithm
R ≤ lnK
δ
+ ηT + δβT.
What remains is then an optimization problem in δ and η which is subject to the following two constraints:
η ∈ [0, 1] and δ
1− (1− ηK )Θ
∈ [0, 1]. (22)
In this optimization problem the only assumption made on the algorithm of agents is that they are select arms randomly
and that the probability of selecting an arm has a minimum value ε.
min
δ,η
f(δ, η) =
lnK
δ
+ η · T + δβT
Subject to
g1(δ, η) ≤ 0,
g2(δ, η) ≤ 0,
(23)
where
g1(δ, η) = −η,
g2(δ, η) =
δ
1−Θ(1− ηN )
− 1, (24)
and
Θ = Πbi=2(1−
ηi
K
),
β =
1
1− (1− 1K )Θ
+ 1,
(25)
If δ? and η? is a local minimum that satisfies Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions(see below).
Stationary:
−∇f(δ?, η?) = µ1 · ∇g1(δ?, η?) + µ2 · ∇g2(δ?, η?), (26)
Primal feasibility:
g1(δ
?, η?) ≤ 0
g2(δ
?, η?) ≤ 0, (27)
Dual feasibility:
µ1 ≥ 0
µ2 ≥ 0
(28)
Complementary slackness:
µ1 · g1(δ?, η?) = 0
µ2 · g2(δ?, η?) = 0
(29)
In each step we will assume that some of these constraints are active (i.e.,gi(δ, η) = 0), and find the points that satisfy
the KKT conditions,
−∇f(δ, η) =
(
lnK
δ2 − Tβ−T
)
(30)
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First, let us assume that only first constraint is active,
g1(δ, η) = 0.
Which yields that
η? = 0.
The only stationary point in this case is
δ? =
√
lnK
βT
. (31)
And the Θ that primal and dual feasibility holds for is
Θ ≤ 1−
√
lnK
βT
. (32)
Since δ? and η? satisfy KKT conditions they are valid answers for this interval. The regret is
R ≤
√
β lnKT. (33)
Second, let us assume that only the second constraint is active. In this case the stationary point is
δ? = 1−Θ(1− η
K
)
η? =
K
Θ
√
lnK
(β +K/Θ)T
+
K(Θ − 1)
Θ
.
(34)
The interval that this answer is valid for is as follows,
Θ ≥ 1−
√
lnK
(β + KΘ )T
. (35)
The regret is
R ≤ 2
√
(β +
K
Θ
)T lnK +
K(Θ − 1)T
Θ
. (36)
Finally, let us assume that all of the constraints are active. In this case the stationary point is
δ? = 1−Θ
η? = 0 .
(37)
And the interval that this answer is valid is as follows,
Θ ≥ 1−
√
lnK
βT
,
Θ ≤ 1−
√
lnK
(β + KΘ )T
.
(38)
The regret is
R ≤ lnK
1−Θ + (1−Θ)βT . (39)
After solving the inequalities (32), (35) and (38) we get the desired bound for the regret.
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Lemma A.2.
∑K
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
≤ 1
1−(1− 1K )Θ
+ 1
def
= β for all t.
Proof of Lemma A.2. By definition (see Equations 5 and 6),
S
def
=
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
p′j(t)
=
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
1− (1− pj(t)) · · · (1− qbj(t))
.
Since qij ≥ εi/K, clearly
S ≤
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
1− (1− pj(t))Θ .
Notice that the right-hand side is strictly concave with respect to each pi. Thus, the maximum is achieved either
on the boundary of the feasible region of p, or at a single point in the interior. Recall that pi ∈ [η/K, 1− (K − 1) ηK ],
and that p is a probability distribution. Hence, boundary points are of the form η/K for all except one entry, which is
1− (K − 1) ηK . If p is of this form, then
S ≤ (K − 1)
K
· η
1− (1− ηK )Θ
+
1− (K−1)ηK
1− (K−1)ηΘK
≤ η
1− (1− ηK )Θ
+ 1. (40)
If, instead, the maximum is achieved on the interior, it must be symmetric, i.e., the probability of playing all actions
is 1/K; otherwise, since the equation is symmetric, there would be more than one maximal distribution which contradicts
strict concavity. If p is of this form, then
S ≤ 1
1− (1− 1K )Θ
. (41)
Since η ∈ [0, 1], we can upper bound both the right-hand sides of Equations 40 and 41 to attain the desired bound:
K∑
i=1
pi(t)
p′i(t)
≤ 1
1− (1− 1K )Θ
+ 1.
A.2 Proof of Main Theorem 4.1
For this result, we use the same unbiased estimator as presented in the main body of the paper, but take a different
approach in the analysis. Instead of having an explicit exploration parameter η > 0, we instead will allow the update
parameter δt to vary with time t (in fact, in this case η = 0). This sort of analysis is common (see, e.g., [BCB12]
and [KNVM14]), in particular in settings where T is unknown. In our case the adaptive δt functions to incorporate
information from neighbors as we see it.
Proof of Main Theorem 4.1. The first part of proof (from Equation (42) to Equation (48)) parallels the format of the
proof of Theorem 3.1 in [BCB12] for the usual bandit setting. We first write the E[l̂j(t)] as Equation (42), then we
upper bound the first term and lower bound the second term, which leads to Equation (48).
E[l̂j(t)] =
1
δ
(
lnE
[
exp
(
−δ
(
l̂j(t)− E[l̂j(t)]
))]
− lnE
[
exp
(
−δl̂j(t)
)])
. (42)
where the expectation is over the randomness of the estimator and choice of the arm.
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We now diverge from the usual proof template: In the next step we find an upper bound for the first term in
right-hand side of above equation.
1
δ
lnE
[
exp
(
−δ(l̂j(t)− E[l̂j(t)])
)]
=
1
δ
lnE
[
exp(−δl̂j(t)
]
+ E[l̂j(t)])
≤ 1
δ
E[exp(−δl̂j(t))− 1 + δl̂j(t)]
≤ δ
2
E[l̂2j (t)],
(43)
where in the second inequality we use lnx ≤ x − 1 and in the last inequality we use exp(−x) − 1 + x ≤ x2/2 for
x ≥ 0. Defining L̂j(t) =
∑t
a=1 l̂j(t) we have
−1
δ
lnEat∼p′tEj∼p′t exp(−δl̂j(t)) ≤ −
1
δ
Eat∼p′t lnEj∼p′t exp(−δl̂j(t))
= −1
δ
Eat∼p′t ln
K∑
j=1
p′j(t) exp(−δl̂j(t))
= −1
δ
Eat∼p′t
ln
 K∑
j=1
(1− η) exp(−δL̂j(t))∑K
c=1 exp(−δL̂c(t− 1))
+
η
K
exp(−δl̂j(t))

≤ −1
δ
Eat∼p′t
 η
K
K∑
j=1
(−δl̂j(t)) + (1− η)
ln
 K∑
j=1
exp(−δL̂j(t))∑K
c=1 exp(−δL̂c(t− 1))
 ,
(44)
where in the first and last inequality we used the Jensen’s inequality. Now we want to upper bound the term
− 1δ ln
(∑K
i=j
exp(−δL̂j(t))∑K
c=1 exp(−δL̂c(t−1))
)
in the above inequality.
−1
δ
ln
 K∑
j=1
exp(−δL̂j(t))∑K
c=1 exp(−δL̂c(t− 1))
 = ψ(t− 1)− ψ(t), (45)
where ψ(t) = 1δ ln
(
1
K
∑K
c=1 exp(−δL̂c(t))
)
. By summing up these terms in Equation (42), (44), and (45) we get
T∑
t=1
E[l̂j(t)] ≤
T∑
t=1
δ
2
E[l̂2j (t)] +
T∑
t=1
η
K
Eat∼p′t
K∑
c=1
l̂c(t)− Eat∼p′tψ(T ). (46)
By bounding −ψ(T ) we are able to find an upper bound on the regret.
−ψ(T ) = lnK
δ
− 1
δ
ln
 K∑
j=1
exp(−δL̂j(T ))

≤ lnK
δ
− 1
δ
ln
(
exp(−δL̂k(T ))
)
=
lnK
δ
+ L̂k(T ).
(47)
Plugging this in the above inequality yields
T∑
t=1
E[l̂j(t)] ≤
T∑
t=1
δ
2
E[l̂2j (t)] +
T∑
t=1
η
K
Eat∼p′t
K∑
c=1
l̂c(t) +
lnK
δ
+ Eat∼p′t [L̂k(T )]. (48)
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In fact, having more neighbors help us to get better bounds for E[l̂2j (t)].
Now, we note that given pj(t) at time t we have
E [ĝi(t)] = gi(t), (49a)
E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pi(t)ĝi(t)
]
=
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pi(t)gi(t) = E
[
T∑
t=1
ga(t)(t)
]
, and (49b)
E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pi(t)ĝ
2
i (t)
]
=
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pi(t)
p′i(t)
g2i (t). (49c)
Where the expectation is over randomness of the algorithm. Note that gi(t) is less than 1, as a result we have,
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pi(t)
p′i(t)
g2i (t) ≤
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pi(t)
p′i(t)
.
Setting η = 0 and using the Lemma A.4 we have
R ≤ lnK
δT
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
δt(1 + γt). (50)
To conclude the proof, let δt =
√
lnK∑t
c=1(1+γt)
and use Lemma 3.5 of [ACBG02], which gives an upper bound on the
regret to get the expected regret, simply take expectation of the both sides of Equation (50).
Lemma A.3. For pi ∈ [0, 1] we want to show that Πbi=1(1− pi) ≤ 11+∑bi=1 pi .
Proof. The following formula holds for all positive pi,
Πbi=1(1 + p
i) ≥ 1 +
b∑
i=1
pi, (51)
which implies
1
Πbi=1(1 + p
i)
≤ 1
1 +
∑b
i=1 p
i
. (52)
As we have
Πbi=1(1− pi) ·Πbi=1(1 + pi)
= Πbi=1(1− (pi)2) ≤ 1,
(53)
We can conclude
Πbi=1(1− pi) ≤
1
Πbi=1(1 + p
i)
. (54)
From (52) and (54) we get
Πbi=1(1− pi) ≤
1
Πbi=1(1 + p
i)
≤ 1
1 +
∑b
i=1 p
i
.
(55)
Lemma A.4.
∑K
j=1
pj
1−(1−pj)(1−q1j )···(1−qbj )
≤∑Kj=1 pjpj+q1j+q2j+···+qbj + 1.
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Proof. From Lemma A.3 we have
(1− pj)(1− q1j ) · · · (1− qbj) ≤
1
1 + pj + q1j + q
2
j + · · ·+ qbj
, (56)
substituting this bound in the statement of lemma yields
K∑
j=1
pj
1− (1− pj)(1− q1j ) · · · (1− qbj)
≤
K∑
j=1
pj
1− 1
1+pj+q1j+q
2
j+···+qbj
≤
K∑
j=1
pj
pj + q1j + q
2
j + · · ·+ qbj
+ 1,
(57)
A.3 Proof of Regret Lower Bound
Proof of Theorem 4.2. This proof follows, with some adjustments, from the proof of Theorem 5.1 in [ACBFS03]; we
simply point out the key differences here. In this proof a random distribution of rewards is constructed, one of the
actions is chosen uniformly at random to be the “good” action, which is 1 with probability 1/2 +  and 0 otherwise for
some small fixed  ∈ (0, 1/2]. The remaining actions are 0 or 1 with probability 1/2.
In Equation (30) of [ACBFS03], where the relative entropy between two Bernoulli random variables with parameters
P and Q is calculated, the total number of past observation is T . In our case, it is between
∑T
t=1 nt and T +
∑T
t=1 nt
where nt is the size of the set of arms selected (arbitrarily) by all of the individual?s neighbors at time t. Note that,
stopping here, this would lead directly to the proof of Theorem 4.5. Here, we dig into the proof to break up the regret in
a way that allows us to write the regret with respect to our γt, which will result in a tighter bound.
More precisely, let r denote the entire sequence of rewards, let f is an arbitrary function on such histories r to
a fixed range [0, T ], and let Ni be a random variable denoting the number of times an algorithm selects arm i. We
let Ei be the expectation taken conditioned on i being the good action, and Eunif denotes the expectation taken over
a uniformly random choice of rewards for all actions (including the good action). Then, Lemma A.1 in [ACBFS03]
becomes
Ei[f(r)] ≤ Eunif [f(r)] + T
2
√
−(Eunif [Ni]) ln(1− 42),
when f(r) is the number of times that we choose arm i. Note that, for our algorithm, Eunif [Ni] =
∑T
t=1 1 − (1 −
pi(t))(1− q1i (t)) · · · (1− qbi (t)). Using the lemma, if we set  = c
√
K∑K
i=1 Eunif [Ni]
, and continue to follow the proof of
Theorem 5.1 in [ACBFS03]. By observing that Ω
(
T
√
K∑K
i=1 Eunif [Ni]
)
= Ω
(
T +
∑T
t=1 γt
)
, we recover the desired
lower bound.
A.4 Comparison to Arm-Network Algorithms
We compare our algorithm to arm-network algorithms which, though developed for a different setting, could be applied
to ours. These algorithms are given for a multi-armed-bandit (MAB) with side observations encoded as an arm-network.
In these papers, authors assume the arms form a arm-network Gt (the arm-network can change over time). The
arm-network is a directed graph, whose vertices represent the arms, and an edge from arm i to arm j means that by
choosing arm i we observe the reward of arm j (see Figure 2). First, let recall our interpretation of our problem as a
multi-armed bandit problem with an arm-network (see Figure 2). The players choose arms according to their algorithm,
and after selecting and revealing the rewards. Each player i individually can construct a arm-network. If we show the
arms selected by neighbors of player i by A[N(i)], in arm-network there is an edge from all arms (vertices) to A[N(i)].
In addition, if we denote the cardinality of set A[N(i)] by Ci, the independence number α of the underlying graph is
K + 1− Ci.
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We show that our algorithm’s regret is at most that of EXP3G, the state-of-the-art algorithm for the arm-network set-
ting. From Theorem 4.1, we know that that the regret of our algorithm is O˜
(√
T +
∑T
t=1 γt
)
and from [ACBDK15]
the regret of EXP3G is O˜
(√∑T
t=1 αt
)
.
With some abuse of notation, let A be the arms chosen by neighbors of 0 let C be its cardinality, and let 1{j ∈ A}
be an indicator random variable that is 1 if and only if j is in A. Lastly, let 1{j = a`t} be an indicator random variable
that is 1 if and only if player ` (one of the neighbors) chooses arm j at round t. First, we lower bound α using the
indicator random variable defined above, then we show that in expectation this term is greater than γt.
Lemma A.5. The independence number α is lower bounded as follows
αt ≥
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t) +
∑b
`=1 1{j = a`t}
. (58)
Proof. First, we show the following
αt ≥
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t) + 1{j ∈ A} . (59)
Decomposing the sum we have
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t) + 1{j ∈ A} =
∑
j∈A
pj(t)
pj(t) + 1
+
∑
j /∈A
pj(t)
pj(t)
, (60)
plugging the cardinality of A we get
=
∑
j∈A
pj(t)
pj(t) + 1
+K − C, (61)
we know α = 1 +K − C (this comes from the fact that arms in A are connected to all arms, see Figure 2), knowing
that
∑
j∈A
pj(t)
pj(t)+1
is less than 1 completes the first part of lemma.
Second, we have 1{j ∈ A} ≤∑b`=1 1{j = a`t}, which yields the lemma.
In the Lemma A.5, the term 1{j = a`t} can be seen as an unbiased estimator for q`j(t) (we denote it by q̂`j(t)). As a
final step, we show the following lemma.
Lemma A.6. For a multinomial distribution q and their unbiased estimator q̂`j(t) = 1{j = a`t}, we have√√√√ T∑
t=1
(1 + γt) ≤ Eq̂∼q

√√√√2 T∑
t=1
αt
 (62)
Proof. Because αt ≥ 1, we know
∑T
t=1 αt ≥ T . As a result by showing
√∑T
t=1(γt) ≤ Eq̂∼q
[√∑T
t=1 αt
]
, we can
conclude
√
T +
∑T
t=1(γt) ≤ Eq̂∼q
[√
2
∑T
t=1 αt
]
.
From Lemma A.5, we have
Eq̂∼q

√√√√ T∑
t=1
αt
 ≥ Eq̂∼q
√√√√ T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t) +
∑b
`=1 q̂
`
j(t)
 . (63)
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In the next step, we want to show
Eq̂∼q
√√√√ T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t) +
∑b
`=1 q̂
`
j(t)
 ≥
√√√√ T∑
t=1
γt.
Let φ(q̂) = φ(q̂1(1), q̂2(1), · · · , q̂b(1), q̂1(2), · · · , q̂b(T )) =
√∑T
t=1
∑K
j=1
pj(t)
pj(t)+
∑b
`=1 q̂
`
j(t)
. This function is convex
(it is convex along every arbitrary line with positive entires, so it is convex), we can use Jensen’s inequality to swap the
order of expectation and φ to get the following.
Eq̂∼q [φ(q̂)] ≥ φ (Eq̂∼q [q̂]) = φ (q) =
√√√√ T∑
t=1
γt. (64)
The first inequality is Jensen’s inequality and the last equality comes from definition of γt.
B Stochastic Bandits
In this section, we first formally state and prove the results for the stochatic setting. Let us first recall our result:
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 3.1). Consider an agent with neighbors who play arbitrarily. Let n′i(t) be the number times
arm i has been selected by one of her neighbors by time t. Then, the regret of UCBN for any α > 2 is
R ≤
∑
i,∆i>0
(
max
{
max
t=1,..,T
{
2α ln t
∆i
− n′i(t)∆i
}
, 0
}
+
α
α− 2
)
, (65)
where ∆i is the difference between µi? and µi.
Corollary B.2. On a complete graph with b nodes, if all agents use UCBN then under the same conditions as in
Theorem 3.1, the regret of an agent is
R ≤
∑
i,∆i>0
(
2α lnT
b∆i
+
α
α− 2
)
∈ O
(
K lnT
b
)
. (66)
The following lower bound yields same behavior for getting free observation from neighbors.
Theorem B.3. Consider a strategy that satisfies E[ni(T )] = o(T a), any arm i with ∆i > 0, and any a > 0. Let ct(i)
be the number of times arm i selected (arbitrarily) by all of the agent’s neighbors up to time t, then, for any set of
Bernoulli reward distributions the following inequality holds
lim
T−→+∞
inf
R
lnT
≥
∑
i,∆i>0
1
2∆i
− lim
T−→+∞
inf
∑
i,∆i>0
cT (i)∆i
lnT
. (67)
Our proofs parallel, with additional bookkeeping, the proofs for the original UCB results (see, e.g., [BCB12] for a
template). Note that the results for stochastic bandits hold when the reward distributions satisfy the following standard
conditions.
Definition B.1 (Conditions on Fi). Every reward distribution Fi satisfies Hoefding’s lemma, i.e., there exists a convex
function ψ on the reals such that, for all λ ≥ 0, we have ln [E [eλ|X−E[X]|]] ≤ ψ(λ) where X ∼ Fi.
For example, when X ∈ [0, 1], one can take ψ(λ) = λ28 ; indeed the results in the main body of the paper take this
ψ. The results can be easily generalized for other ψ in the usual manner.
We first prove a lemma that will be of assistance in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Recall that a(t) is the arm the agent
selects at time t.
25
Lemma B.4. If a(t) = i, at least one of the three following inequalities is true:
µ̂i?,ni? (t−1) +
√
α ln t
2ni?(t− 1) ≤ µ
?, (68a)
µ̂i,ni(t−1) > µi +
√
α ln t
2ni(t− 1) , (68b)
ni(t− 1) < 2α ln t42i
. (68c)
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that a(t) = i and that none of the inequalities (68a), (68b) or (68c) are
true.
µ̂i?,ni? (t−1) +
√
α ln t
2ni?(t− 1) > µ
?, (69a)
µ̂i,ni(t−1) < µi +
√
α ln t
2ni(t− 1) , (69b)
ni(t− 1) > 2α ln t42i
. (69c)
By plugging µ? = µi +4i in Equation (69a) we obtain
µ̂i?,ni? (t−1) +
√
α ln t
2ni?(t− 1) > µi +4i. (70)
From Equation (69c) we have
µi +4i > µi +
√
2α ln t
ni(t− 1) (71)
and plugging (71) in (70) yields
µ̂i?,ni? (t−1) +
√
α ln t
2ni?(t− 1) > µ̂i,ni(t−1) +
√
α ln t
2ni(t− 1) . (72)
By our criteria for selecting arms given by Equation (1), this implies a(t) 6= i.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 . Let
ni(t) = n
1
i (t) + n
′
i(t), (73)
where n1i (t) is the number of times the agent selects the arm i and n
′
i(t) is the number of times her neighbors select
arm i. Using Lemma B.4, we will first find an upper bound for n1i (t) for a suboptimal arm i.
Lemma B.4 states that at least one of the three inequalities (68a), (68b) and (68c) must be true. If Equation (68c)
holds, then from (73) we obtain
n1i (t) ≤
2α
42i
ln t− n′i(t). (74)
Let U be the maximum of right hand side of (74) for t = 1, .., T :
U = max
{
max
t=1,..,T
{
2α
42i
ln t− n′i(t)
}
4i, 0
}
, (75)
as a result if the Equation (68c) holds for some instance k, then n1i (k) is bounded by U , i.e.,
n1i (k) ≤ U. (76)
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For bounding the regret we find an upper bound on the number of times we select a suboptimal arm i:
E[n1i (T )] = E
[
T∑
t=1
1a(t)=i
]
= E
[
U∑
t=1
1a(t)=i
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=U+1
1a(t)=i
]
. (77)
Since E
[∑U
t=1 1a(t)=i
]
≤ U , we can deduce
E[n1i (T )] ≤ U + E
[
T∑
t=U+1
1a(t)=i
]
, (78)
as we saw in (B.4), 1{a(t)=i} = 1 requires that at least one of the three equations (68a), (68b) and (68c) is true. Assume
the last time that (68c) is true is at time ζ, hence
n1i (ζ) ≤
2α
42i
ln ζ − n′i(ζ), (79)
and since ζ is the last time that (68c) holds, we can upper bound E[n1i (T )] by
E[n1i (T )] ≤
2α
42i
ln ζ − n′i(ζ) + E
 T∑
t=ζ+1
1{(68a) or (68b) is true and (68c) is false}
 . (80)
According to the definition of U in (75) and Equation (80) we have
E[n1i (T )] ≤ U + E
[
T∑
t=U+1
1{(68a) or (68b) is true and (68c) is false}
]
(81)
≤ U +
T∑
t=U+1
P[(68a) is true] + P[(68b) is true]. (82)
It suffices to bound the probability (68a) and (68b):
P [(68a) is true] =
∑
ni(t)
P [(68a) is true|ni(t)] · P [ni(t)] . (83)
Recall that
P [(68a) is true|ni(t)] ≤ 1
tα
. (84)
Plugging (84) in (83) yields that
P [(68a) is true] ≤ 1
tα
∑
ni(t)
P [ni(t)] =
1
tα
. (85)
Then we take integral of 1tα for t from 1 to T , which is smaller than
α
2(α−2) . The same upper bound holds for (68b).
Thus, the regret is
R ≤
∑
i,4i>0
(
max
{
max
t=1,..,T
{
2α
42i
ln t− n′i(t)
}
4i, 0
}
+
α
α− 2
)
(86)
as desired.
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B.1 UCBN on Complete Graphs
In this section, we analyze the regret in a complete graph when all agents use UCBN. The following curious lemma
will assist in the proof.
Lemma B.5. Given a complete graph of agents, if all agents use UCBN with a deterministic common tie breaking
scheme, then in every time step all agents select the same action.
Proof. Since the graph is complete, all agents see the rewards of other agents at every time step; hence the sample
means ŝi(t) and number of samples ni(t) at time t are the same for all agents. Furthermore, every agent selects an arm
according to criteria (1) and a common deterministic tie breaking rule. Therefore, the arm selected at time t will be
same for all agents.
Proof of Corollary B.2. Let
U =
[
2α lnT
b · 42i
]
. (87)
We bound the number of times action i other than the best arm is selected. Following the proof of Theorem 3.1,
E[n1i (T )] ≤ U +
T∑
t=U+1
P[(68a) is true] + P[(68b) is true]. (88)
The upper bound of the probabilities (68a) and (68b) are same as before. Hence, the regret bound is
R ≤
∑
i,4i>0
(
2α
b · 4i lnT +
α
α− 2
)
. (89)
B.2 Lower Bound
The lower bound for UCB [LR85] is
lim
T−→+∞
inf
R
lnT
≥
∑
i,4i>0
4i
kl(µi, µ?)
. (90)
Our proof again follows the same template.
Proof of Theorem B.3. As in [LR85], we assume the rewards are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution. From their proof
it follows that the expected number of times that a suboptimal arm must be selected in order to distinguish between best
arm and other arms is at least
E[ni(T )] + cT (i) ≥ (1 + o(1))1− ε
1 + ε
lnT
kl(µi, µ?)
. (91)
where the second term is the information coming from the neighbors (that is, the number of times neighbors selected
arm i up to time t), µ? is the mean of the best arm, and kl(p, q) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between a Bernoulli
variable with parameter p and a Bernoulli variable with parameter q, defined to be
kl(p, q)
def
= p ln
(
p
q
)
+ (1− p) ln
(
1− p
1− q
)
. (92)
As the number of rounds increases, ε can be taken to be smaller. As T goes to infinity, ε can be taken zero; as a
result we can write the following lower bound for the regret
lim
T−→+∞
inf
R+
∑
i,∆i>0
cT (i)∆i
lnT
≥
∑
i,4i>0
4i
kl(µi, µ?)
. (93)
Applying Pinkser’s inequality yields the lower bound.
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